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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
and depressing to persons of normal sensibilities and not those who are
hypersensitive and extra-fastidious, or possess an overly superstitious
nature.19 While it is true that a cemetery and a funeral home have many
comparable characteristics, it still rests upon the facts and circumstances
of each case to determine whether a nuisance in fact exists.20 The instant
decision appears to be unfounded in fact and in law since no evidence
was produced to show actual or probable danger to health and physical
comfort.21  It seems repugnant to the principles of equity to arbitrarily
declare a cemetery a nuisance for psychic reasons only.22  It represents
the inequitable situation whereby a person is deprived of the right2a
to reasonably use his land for a lawful and necessary enterprise,24 when
no harmi conies to others. Paul Low
REAL PROPERTY-POSSIBILITIES OF REVERTER-
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATUTE
Two suits were brought by purchasers of tax deeds against a holder
of a possibility of reverter. Relief in the first case was sought under a
lorida statute' which was enacted to cancel reverter clauses of unlimited
duration, in plats and deeds, which have been in existence more than
21 years. The second suit sought relief under the Murphy Act,2 which
298 Mich. 15, 298 N.W. 386 (1941); Streett v. Marshall, 316 Mo. 698, 291 S.W.
494 (1927); Bragg v. Ives, 149 Va. 482, 140 S.E. 656 (1927).
19. Densmore v. Evergreen Camp, 61 Wash. 230, 112 Pac. 255 (1910); Cunning-
ham v. Miller, 178 Wis. 22, 189 N.W, 531 (1922).
20. Nelson v. Swedish E.L. Cemetery Ass'n, 111 Minn. 149, 126 N.W. 723(1910
21: Testimony proved that the atmosphere and the well water near the cemetery
would not be contaminated by the interment of dead bodies. Where there is no injury
or danger of injury, there should be no restraints placed upon the operation of a lawful
business.
22. "To complaints based upon purely psychic objections, equity gives no heed,
for it does not regard the melancholy reflections that may be engendered in sensitive
minds by the close proximity of a cemetery as sufficient to brand it a nuisance within
the legal meaning of the term." Dennery v. Hughes, 214 Miss. 687, 59 So.2d 316(1952). 3 COOLEY, TORTS 180 (4th. Ed. 1933): "Cemeteries are not enjoined from
operation as nuisances because offensive to the sensibilities of those residing in the
vicinity"; BURDIcK's, LAw Or TORTs 488 (4th. Ed. 1926); "A cemetery is not a nuisance
because it offends the fancy, delicacy or fastidiousness of neighbors .... "
23. "Relief by injunction is so severe . . . that it is not to be granted ... except
when the right to it is clearly and conclusively made out. To interfere with one's right
to use his own land for the production of what he pleases, in a caseJ of doubt, would
be a flagrant abuse of power." McCutchen v. Blanton, 59 Miss. 116 (1881).
24. ". . . a cemetery is not unlawful, for to provide for the repose of the dead
is just as lawful, and equally as necessary, as to provide for the health and comfort of
the living. The dead must be disposed of in some way, and burial in the earth . . .
seems most appropriate, and certainly is generally resorted to." Farb v. Theis, 250 S.W.
290 (Tex.Civ.App. 1923).
1. FLA. STAT. § 689.18 (1951) (clause 2 reads: "All reverter or forfeiture provi-
sions of unlimited duration embodied in any plat or deed executed more than twenty-one
years prior to the passage of this law conveying real estate or any interest therein of the
State of Florida, be and the same are hereby cancelled and annulled and declared to be
of no further force and effect.")
2. Laws of Fla. 1937, c. 18296.
CASENOTES -
declared that reverter rights do not survive a tax deed. Circuit court
judgments were for the tax deed holders and on appeal, held, reversed
Application of the 1951 statute3 to pre-existing reverter clauses would
impair the obligation of contract, and also deprive persons of their
property without due process of law. The statute4 is unconstitutional
when so applied. Bittmore Village, Inc. v. Royal Biltmore Village, Inc. v.
Rotolante, 71 So.2d 727 (Fla. 1953).
The obligation of contracts is protected by both the Federal3 and
Florida6 Constitutions. The limitation imposed by the Federal Constitu-
tion applies only to states and is not a limitation on the legislative power
of our national congress.7 Since no state can pass a law impairing the
obligation of contracts, it necessarily follows that state agencies are also
similarly restricted." The "obligation of contracts" within the terms of
the Federal Constitution refers to legal obligations which are measured
by the law existing at the time the contract is entered into." This con-
stitutional protection also applies to property rights.' 0 But it must be
shown in all cases that a valid and lawful contract is in existence which
is subject to impairment.'1 In this case, neither the legality of the
contract nor of its covenants was in issue. It is now accepted, by both
state and federal courts, that once a valid contract has been entered
into, state legislation will not be enforced which impairs the obligations
of those valid contracts or destroys the means of enforcing those obliga-
tions, where the means of enforcement are part of the contract. 12
The United States Supreme Court has held that "obligation" also
includes the means of enforcement. 13 The reverter rights were put into
the deeds in question to enforce restrictive covenants. Although reverter
rights are not essential to the enforcement of covenants, they are a legal
means of enforcement. The Florida Supreme Court has stated that any
legislation which lessens the efficacy of legal means of enforcing legal
obligations is an "impairment" of an obligation of contract contrary to
constitutional prohibitions.14 By the wording of the 1951 statute,15
the legislature has declared reverter rights, such as the ones involved in
the instant case, to be null and void and of no further force and effect
3. See note 1, supra.
4. Ibid.
5. U.S. CONST. ART. 1, § 10, cl. 1.
6. FLA. CONST. 1885, DEcL. op RICHTS, § 17.
7. New York v. United States, 257 U.S. 591 (1922).
8. Mt. Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 U.S. 514 (1879).
9. King v. Duvall County, 128 Fla. 388, 174 So. 817 (1937).
10. Douglas v. Kentucky, 168 U.S. 488 (1937).
11. Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908).
12. Mahood v. Bessemer Properties, 154 Fla. 710, 18 So.2d 775 (1944).
13. Von Hoffman v. City of Quincy, 4 Wall, 535 (U.S. 1866).
14. State ex rel. Sovereign Camp v. 0. W. v. Boring, 121 Fla. 781, 164 So. 859
(1935); State ex rel. Woman's Ben. Ass'n. v. Port of Palm Beach Dist., 121 Fla. 746,
164 So. 851 (1935).
15. See note 1, supra.
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after they have been in existence 21 years. This statute attempts to take
away from reverter holders a property right to which they are, by valid
contract, lawfully entitled. Therefore, unless this statute comes within
some exception to the general prohibition against impairment of obliga-
tions of contract, the Florida statute is unconstitutional as applied to
the reverter right holders in this case, and those similarly situated.
Those cases which have held that a state, by legislation, may impair
obligations of contracts, have so held only when that legislation was a
valid exercise of state police powers.'6 The Florida Legislature based its
justification for the 1951 statute' 7 mainly on the ground that reverter
rights, unlimited in duration, make the title to land unmarketable, and
this has the effect of retarding the growth of the State.'5 Since reverter
rights of this type do make titles unnarketable, 19 and it is generally
conceded that state police powers embrace the state's economic welfare, 20
it is conceivable that this statute could have been upheld as constitutional.
However, courts have refused to uphold legislation which takes land, or
any interest therein, from one person and gives it to another purely for
private use.2' Therefore, the 1951 statute22 is unconstitutional as applied
to reverter clauses that were in existence when the statute was passed.
The decision in this case left some questions unanswered. Did the
court, in effect, place a new interpretation on the Murphy Act,23 or was
it held inapplicable? The Florida Supreme Court has previously held
that a tax title, under this act, vests fee simple title in the State and
that the act is constitutional. 2 4 Had the majority opinion been more explicit
on these questions, future litigation concerning these problems might be
greatly minimized.
Howard Barwick.
STATUTES-FLORIDA FAIR TRADE ACT-
U NCONSTITUTIONALITY
Plaintiff, a manufacturer, commenced an action against the defenC"nts,
attempting to enforce the Florida Fair Trade Act.' From a judgment
dismissing its complaint, plaintiff appealed. Held, the particular provision
of the Fair Trade Act sought to be enforced (i.e. the non-signer clause) 2
16. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1933).
17. See note 1, supIra.
18. FLA. STAT. § 689.18 (1951 (Preamble.)
19. Jennings, Marketability of Titles in Florida, 7 MIAMI L.Q. 318 (1953).
20. Thomas v. Sanderlin, 173 N.C. 329, 91 S.E. 1028 (1917).
21. Treighe v. Acme Homestead Ass'n, 297 U.S- 189, rehearing denied, 297 U.S.
728 t1936).
23. See note 2, supra.23. See note 2, supra.
24. See Brice v. Haines City, 142 Fla. 371, 195 So. 919 (1940).
1. FLA. STAT., c. 541 (1953).
2. FLA. STAT. § 541.07 (1953).
